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Does it matter whether research is conducted by the private business rather than in universities or 
government research centres? While most of the attention of science and innovation policy in the last 
decades has explored the relevance of the interconnections between public and business players in 
enhancing knowledge-based societies, a major trend has been ignored: both the quota of public R&D and 
its share over the total R&D investment has shrunk in most OECD countries. As a result, a larger fraction 
of knowledge is today generated in the private sector. We argue that this is a major problem since public 
research and private research differ along a number of characteristics, e.g. public access, potential for 
future technological innovations, criteria of resource allocation. This trend can have adverse implications 
for long-term innovation and economic welfare in our societies. Through the lens of the public goods 
theory and of the sector of funding and execution of R&D for the period 1981-2012 we try to explain 
why. 
Keywords: R&D, Knowledge economy, Public sector, Public goods, Intellectual property, Technology 
transfer. 
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E' un problema se l'attività di ricerca è condotta nelle imprese private piuttosto che nelle università e 
nei centri di ricerca pubblici? Mentre numerosi studi di politica della scienza e dell'innovazione degli 
ultimi decenni hanno esplorato la rilevanza delle interconnessioni tra soggetti pubblici e privati nel 
promuovere le società basate sulla conoscenza, una tendenza fondamentale è stata ignorata: sia la quota di 
R&S pubblica che la sua quota sul totale dell'investimento in R&S sono diminuite nella maggior parte dei 
paesi OCSE. Di conseguenza una frazione maggiore di conoscenza è oggi generata nell'industria. Viene 
qui sostenuto che si tratta di un fondamentale problema perché le attività di ricerca pubblica e quella 
privata hanno sostanziali differenze e specificità, tra le quali: le condizioni di accesso, il potenziale di 
ulteriori innovazioni tecnologiche, i criteri per l'allocazione delle risorse. Queste tendenze hanno 
conseguenze nocive per il benessere e l'innovazione nelle nostre società. Tentiamo di spiegare perché 
attraverso la prospettiva della teoria dei beni pubblici e dei settori di finanziamento e di esecuzione della 
R&S per il periodo 1981-2012. 
Parole	   chiave:	  Economia della conoscenza, Settore pubblico, Beni pubblici, Proprietà intellettuale, 
Trasferimento tecnologico.	  	  
2	  
Acknowledgements	  
A previous version of this paper was presented at the DRUID Conference “The Relevance of Innovation”, 
Rome, 15-17 June 2015 and at the Department of Management of Birkbeck College, London, 23 
February 2016. We would like to thank Henry Etzkowitz, Francesco Gagliardi, Frederick Guy, Maureen 
Mc Kelvey, Richard R. Nelson, Klaus Nielsen, Federica Rossi and Helen Lawton Smith and the other 
participants to the debate for very helpful comments. 
Citare questo documento come segue: 
Daniele Archibugi, Andrea Filippetti (2016). The retreat of public research and its adverse consequences 
on innovation. Roma: Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche – Istituto di Ricerche sulla Popolazione e le 
Politiche Sociali. (IRPPS Working papers n. 94/2016). 
Redazione:	  Marco	  Accorinti,	  Sveva	  Avveduto,	  Corrado	  Bonifazi,	  Rosa	  Di	  Cesare,	  Fabrizio	  Pecoraro,	  
Tiziana	  Tesauro	  
Editing	  e	  composizione:	  Cristiana	  Crescimbene,	  Luca	  Pianelli,	  Laura	  Sperandio	  
La	  responsabilità	  dei	  dati	  scientifici	  e	  tecnici	  è	  dei	  singoli	  autori.	  
©	  Istituto	  di	  ricerche	  sulla	  Popolazione	  e	  le	  Politiche	  Sociali	  2013.	  Via	  Palestro,	  32	  Roma	  
3	  
Index	  
Introduction:	  the	  shift	  from	  public	  R&D	  to	  business	  R&D	  ......................................................	  4	  
1. Beyond	  the	  knowledge-­‐as-­‐a-­‐Public-­‐Good	  view:	  an	  analytical	  framework	  of	  public-­‐
generated	  knowledge	  and	  private-­‐generated	  knowledge	  ...............................................	  9	  
2. Sectors	  of	  financing	  and	  of	  performance	  of	  R&D	  ..........................................................	  13
3. Three	  implications	  ........................................................................................................	  19
4. Discussion	  and	  conclusions	  ...........................................................................................	  21
References	  ..........................................................................................................................	  25	  
 4	  
Introduction:	  the	  shift	  from	  public	  R&D	  to	  business	  R&D	  
In the last decades a major attack has been directed against the public sector. Everything 
labelled public – from hospitals to drinking fountains, from airports to motorways – has been 
described as inefficient, costly and ultimately useless. This is hardly a solely intellectual 
fashion; it is strictly associated to an attempt to move as many as possible of these public 
infrastructures and their associated economic value to the profit-seeking sector. There have been 
important economic consequences: public expenditure has been reduced while many public 
utilities – from trains to telephones – have been privatised. This trend can be observed in 
virtually all advanced countries (see Megginson and Netter, 2001). 
The realm of knowledge has not been immune from this overall mood. While governments 
and the business community continuously recognize the importance of knowledge and 
innovation as crucial components of economic development and human welfare, there has been 
a long-term trend to belittle the contribution of public institutions and to glorify the virtuous of 
business investment (see the enthusiastic call for the downsizing of public R&D by Kealey, 
1996; and the critical rejoinder by David, 1997). This is reflected in the most visible and 
measurable component of knowledge creation, namely the resources devoted to Research and 
Development (R&D). Figures 1 and 2 report the data for, respectively, industry and government 
financed R&D. In most OECD countries a significant shift in the effort to finance public R&D 
has occurred: from 1981 to 2013 the share of public-financed R&D to GDP has been reduced 
from 0.82 per cent to 0.67 per cent. By contrast, the industry-financed R&D has increased from 
0.96 per cent of GDP in 1981 to 1.44 per cent in 2013 (see also Table 1). There are significant 
differences across countries. Japan and South Korea exhibit a virtuous trend where both the 
business and the government have increased their own R&D expenditure; in South Korea, 
particularly, the government expenditure increase has been spectacular. In the US, the UK, 
Canada, France and Germany, by contrast, we assist simultaneously to the growth of industry-
financed R&D and to the decline of government-financed R&D. The temporary slowdown in 
Germany can be attributed to the unification of 1989, while for the UK it has to be noted that a 
larger fraction of private-financed R&D come from foreign sources and therefore it is not 
accounted for in these figures (see note on Table 2). 
The consequence on the composition of R&D is remarkable (Table 2). On the one hand, the 
percentage of gross expenditure of R&D financed by the government has, in the OECD, shrunk 
from 44.2 per cent in 1981 to 28.3 per cent in 2013. The drop has been considerable in every 
country, particularly in the UK and in the US, while South Korea represents the only exception. 
On the other hand, the percentage of gross expenditure financed by industry has increased from 
51.6 per cent of 1981 to 60.8 per cent of 2013. The increase is particularly strong in the US, 
Germany, and the UK. These trends show a clear structural change: the business sector is 
becoming more and more important in knowledge creation, while the public sector is slowly 
retracting (on this trend see also Conceicao et al., 2004; Dinges et al., 2007; Van Pottelsberghe 
De La Potterie, 2008). 
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Table	   1	   -­‐	   Gross	   R&D	   (GERD)	   expenditure	   as	   a	   percentage	   of	   GDP	   by	   source	   of	   funds	   (G-­‐7	  
countries	  plus	  South	  Korea	  and	  OECD	  average),	  rate	  of	  change	  1981-­‐2013	  
	  	  
Industry-­‐financed	  GERD	  as	  a	  
percentage	  of	  GDP	   	  	  
Government-­‐financed	  GERD	  as	  a	  
percentage	  of	  GDP	  
	   	   	   rate	  of	  change	  1981-­‐2013	   	   	   	   rate	  of	  change	  1981-­‐2013	  
Canada	   	   	   53.06%	   	   	   	   -­‐6.56%	  
France	   	   	   63.16%	   	   	   	   -­‐21.21%	  
Germany	   	   	   38.81%	   	   	   	   -­‐13.27%	  
Italy	   	   	   33.33%	   	   	   	   38.46%	  
Japan	   	   	   85.82%	   	   	   	   15.38%	  
South	  Korea*	   	   	   86.90%	   	   	   	   126.19%	  
United	  Kingdom	   	   	   -­‐19.15%	   	   	   	   -­‐59.26%	  
United	  States	   	   	   48.21%	   	   	   	   -­‐29.63%	  
OECD	  -­‐	  Total	   	   	   50.00%	   	   	   	   -­‐18.29%	  
Source:	  OECD	  Main	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Indicators	  (MSTI).	  
Note:	  Data	  for	  South	  Korea	  refer	  to	  1995	  instead	  of	  1981.	  
	  
Fig.	  1	  -­‐	  Industry-­‐financed	  GERD	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP,	  1981-­‐2013	  (selected	  countries)	  
 
 
Source:	  Elaboration	  on	  OECD	  Main	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Indicators	  (MSTI).	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from 44.2 per cent in 1981 to 28.3 per cent in 2013. The drop has been considerable in every 
country, particularly in the UK and in the US, while South Korea represents the only exception. 
On the other hand, the percentage of gross expenditure financed by industry has increased from 
51.6 per cent of 1981 to 60.8 per cent of 2013. The increase is particularly strong in the US, 
Germany, and the UK. These trends show a clear structural change: the business sector is 
becoming more and more important in knowledge creation, while the public sector is slowly 
retracting (on this trend see also Conceicao et al., 2004; Dinges et al., 2007; Van Pottelsberghe 
De La Potterie, 2008). 
 
Fig.	  2	  -­‐	  Government-­‐financed	  GERD	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP,	  1981-­‐2013	  (selected	  countries)	  
 
 
Source:	  Elaboration	  on	  OECD	  Main	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Indicators	  (MSTI).	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Most of the attention of science and innovation policy in the last decades has been directed 
towards the relevance of the interconnections between universities, industry and the 
governments (as in the Triple Helix view) (Colombo et al., 2011; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 
2000; Lawton Smith and Bagchi-Sen, 2010; Sarpong et al., 2015), and the major institutional 
transformations that have followed in the production of knowledge (exemplified in the Mode 2 
knowledge production) (Gibbons et al., 1994). University-industry linkages have become 
imperative and ubiquitous in the political agenda as a means to boost technology transfer and 
for improving training in skills required by the industry (D’Este et al., 2013; Gander, 1986; Hsu 
et al., 2015; Perkmann et al., 2013). Much less concern has been devoted to the overall 
shrinking of public research and to its main effect on innovation, long-term economic growth 
and social welfare (Conceicao et al., 2004).1 
 
Table	  2	  -­‐	  Percentage	  of	  Gross	  R&D	  (GERD)	  expenditure	  by	  source	  of	  funds	  (G-­‐7	  countries	  plus	  
South	  Korea	  countries	  and	  OECD	  average)	  
	  	  
Percentage	  of	  GERD	  financed	  by	  	  
industry	   	  	  
Percentage	  of	  GERD	  financed	  by	  
government	  
year	   1981	   2013	   rate	  of	  change	   	   1981	   2013	   rate	  of	  change	  
Canada	   40.77	   46.45	   13.93%	   	   50.61	   34.86	   -­‐31.12%	  
France	   40.92	   55.38	   35.34%	   	   53.4	   34.97	   -­‐34.51%	  
Germany	   56.85	   65.21	   14.71%	   	   41.79	   29.78	   -­‐28.74%	  
Italy	   50.08	   44.29	   -­‐11.56%	   	   47.21	   42.55	   -­‐9.87%	  
Japan	   67.71	   75.48	   11.48%	   	   24.91	   17.30	   -­‐30.55%	  
South	  Korea*	   76.26	   75.68	   -­‐0.76%	   	   19.04	   22.83	   19.91%	  
United	  Kingdom	   42.05	   46.55	  (70)*	   10.70%	   	   48.1	   26.99	   -­‐43.89%	  
United	  States	   49.41	   60.85	   23.15%	   	   47.8	   27.75	   -­‐41.95%	  
OECD	  -­‐	  Total	   51.64	   60.76	   17.66%	   	  	   44.19	   28.28	   -­‐36.00%	  
Source:	   OECD	   Main	   Science	   and	   Technology	   Indicators	   (MSTI).	   Data	   for	   South	   Korea	   refer	   to	   1995	  
instead	  of	  1981;	   the	  sum	  of	   the	  shares	  does	  not	  add	  up	  to	  100%	  since	   there	  are	  other	  minor	  sources	  
that	  are	  not	  considered,	  namely	  “other	  national	   sources”	  and	  “abroad”.	   In	   the	  UK	  a	  significant	  higher	  
proportion	  of	  R&D	  funding	  comes	  from	  overseas.	  When	  this	  is	  taken	  into	  account	  the	  share	  of	  private-­‐
funded	  R&D	  stands	  at	  70%	  (Economic	  Insight,	  2015,	  p.	  7).	  
 
The so often anticipated knowledge economy is on its way, at least judging from the 
resources devoted to R&D and other scientific, technological and engineering activities, but the 
profit seeking sector is gaining positions at the expenses of the public sector. Is this a problem? 
Two optimist arguments support the view that this is not such a trouble. The first states that this 
is irrelevant provided that new knowledge is generated. The important thing is that we know 
more things and we invest enough resources for it while it is less relevant if new discoveries and 
inventions are made by public or business players. The second is that the private sector is more 
efficient than the public sector, and research carried out in the latter has greater impact on 
business innovation performance and on countries’ competitiveness. If the business sector 
proves to be more efficient in the way it generates knowledge, there is no reason why this 
                                                            
1 For a recent array of contributions on science and technology policy see Crespi and Quatraro (2013) and 
the related special issue on Systemic technology policies: Issues and instruments. 
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should be kept within the public sector. Therefore, our research question is: does it matter 
whether research is conducted in universities or government research centres, rather than by 
the private business? 
We will argue that the so often applauded current privatisation of research activity and 
knowledge (see Kealey, 1996; Ridley, 2015) can have major consequences on innovation and, 
ultimately, on long-term economic growth and social welfare.2 One of the central reasons why 
the threat to knowledge augmenting is largely ignored or under-estimated is associated to an 
unclear understanding of the economic characteristics of knowledge. In this paper we first 
develop an analysis of the differences between knowledge generated in the public sector and 
knowledge generated in the private sector. On the ground of data on R&D expenditure in OECD 
countries we discuss a number of implications for innovation and science policy. We will argue 
that it does matter where knowledge is produced: knowledge produced in the public sector has 
very different economic characteristics compared to knowledge produced in the business sector. 
When this is taken into account, the change in the composition between public and private 
research has consequences for the current and future pace of technological innovation and long-
term economic growth. 
This paper is related to a broad discussion which is taking place both in the academy and in 
policy circles: is science, thought its application to technological innovation, an essential engine 
of long-term economic growth? (Deiaco et al., 2012; Havas, 2008). The emergence of a new 
institutional reconfiguration of universities, as increasingly nested into the economic production 
process along with the industry and the government has been described as a major break in the 
production of knowledge, as in the “Mode 2” (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000) or as an 
emerging system in which public and private institutions tend to overlap, as in the “Triple 
Helix” view (Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1996). According to these scholars, these major 
changes have basically blurred the functional differentiation between science and markets, and 
that between public and private (Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1996).  
A recent contribution by Mariana Mazzucato has re-fuelled the debate about the role that the 
state, through investment in basic science, has played for technological development in the 
industry, somehow restating the value of the linear model of innovation (Balconi et al., 2010; 
Godin, 2006). We are therefore addressing the much heated debate about the economic 
relevance of the public funding of science. On the one hand, scientists have been concerned in 
recent years not only about the downsizing of funding for public research, but also that 
governments “have been overemphasizing ‘translational research’ (e.g. research intended to 
result in a product or the improvement of a product) at the expense of basic research” (Orac, 
2015). On the other hand there are those attacking, in fact, the basis of the linear model of 
innovation – or better the ‘vulgar science-push’ version of it (David, 1997) - as we can read 
from an influential editorial that appeared on the Wall Street Journal: “Politicians believe that 
innovation can be turned on and off like a tap: You start with pure scientific insights, which 
then get translated into applied science, which in turn become useful technology. So what you 
must do, as a patriotic legislator, is to ensure that there is a ready supply of money to scientists 
on the top floor of their ivory towers, and lo and behold, technology will come clanking out of 
                                                            
2 For opinions which goes against the stream see Mazzuccato (2013) and M.I.T. (2015). 
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the pipe at the bottom of the tower” (Ridley, 2015). In brief, this debate opposes those arguing 
that government-funded basic research is an idle path toward innovations and that the market 
can do it better, to others countering that publicly-funded research provides benefits which 
cannot be substituted by private research. In the end, the debate seems to boil down to 
differences in opinion about how much science should be publicly or privately funded. This is 
what we are concerned about in this paper. 
1. Beyond	  the	  knowledge-­‐as-­‐a-­‐Public-­‐Good	  view:	  an	  analytical	  framework	  of	  
public-­‐generated	  knowledge	  and	  private-­‐generated	  knowledge	  
For many years knowledge has been considered to be a public good. Economics Nobel Prize 
winner Kenneth Arrow (1962) contributed to disseminate this view in one of the most cited 
articles in the economics of innovation, arguing that knowledge is costly to produce but could 
be disseminated as information at zero or very low costs. This view is rather persistent if it was 
re-stated by another authoritative Nobel Prize winner such as Joseph Stiglitz (1999). This view 
has been developed within the classic welfare economics perspective in which the public-good 
characteristics of knowledge lead to under-investment in the private sector, a market failure 
which could be solved either by assigning (intellectual) property rights to the inventor or with 
the intervention of the public sector (Arrow 1962. For a review, see Archibugi and Filippetti, 
2015b).  
While that theory addressed the problem of the optimal level of the production of 
knowledge, it did not consider the problem of the diffusion of knowledge. This is consistent 
with the assumption that knowledge could be considered a public-good: if this is the case, once 
it is generated it would spread throughout the economic system and the society thanks to its 
characteristics of non-rivalry and non-excludability. However, a great body of research has 
demonstrated that knowledge has both public and private components (Callon, 1994; Nelson, 
1989; Pavitt, 1987). We stress that public-generated knowledge and private-generated 
knowledge have different economic characteristics, particularly in terms of the degree of rivalry 
and excludability. This in turn shapes the diffusion process and the subsequent generation of 
knowledge and innovation. The way in which knowledge production is funded – public or 
business - does matter for subsequent application for innovation. In particular, the differences 
in: A) resources allocation; B) excludability in consumption; and C) excludability in production 
should be considered. Table 3 summarizes some fundamental differences between public-
generated and private-generated knowledge. 
A. There is a great difference between public-generated and private-generated allocation of 
resources for knowledge. Indeed, one of the criteria identified by Ostrom and Ostrom (1999) to 
divide private and public goods is precisely the allocation mechanism. According to their 
classification, a good is private if the allocation mechanisms are made primarily by market 
mechanisms; by contrast, a good is public if the allocation decisions are made primarily by 
political process. According to this definition, private-generated knowledge would clearly be 
regarded as a private good.  
The allocation of resources for R&D is a key determinant of the possible outcome and future 
development of science. It is the allocation of resources that determines the direction of 
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scientific discovery, although with some degree of uncertainty that is inherent to any discovery 
process. For instance, it is well known that “serendipity” (Gilles, 2015) is a key characteristic of 
science, especially basic science. But it is hard to get a cure for cancer by doing research in 
cosmetics, while it is more likely to get some fundamental medical discoveries by doing basic 
research on genes and cells. As a matter of fact, new anti-cancer therapies stemmed from 
federally-funded basic research into the fundamental working of cells in the USA (M.I.T., 
2015). Nobel Laureate Arthur Kornberg put this very well: “The pursuit of curiosity about the 
basic facts of nature has proven to be the route by which the successful drugs and devices of 
modern medicine were most often discovered”.  
 
Table	  3	  -­‐	  Economic	  differences	  between	  private-­‐generated	  and	  public-­‐generated	  knowledge	  
	  
	   Private-­‐generated	  knowledge	   Public-­‐generated	  knowledge	  
A.	  
	  
Resources	  allocated	  through	  market	  
mechanism.	  
The	  main	  purpose	  is	  to	  contribute	  to	  profits	  
though	  knowledge-­‐based	  products,	  services	  
and	  processes.	  
Resources	  allocated	  through	  political	  
process.	  
The	  main	  purpose	  is	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  
advancement	  of	  knowledge	  and	  social	  
welfare.	  
B.	  
Excludability	  in	  consumption	  pursued	  through	  
active	  strategies	  such	  as	  industrial	  secrecy	  and	  
proprietary	  forms	  of	  intellectual	  property.	  
Non-­‐excludability	  in	  consumption	  
implemented	  through	  technology	  
transfer	  policies	  and	  full	  disclosure	  (e.g.	  
open	  science	  and	  non-­‐proprietary	  forms	  
of	  intellectual	  property).	  
C.	  
Excludability	  in	  production	  associated	  to	  firm-­‐
specific	  technical	  knowledge	  and	  tacit	  
knowledge.	  
Non-­‐excludability	  in	  production	  actively	  
sought	  reducing	  tacit	  knowledge.	  
Source:	  Authors	  elaboration.	  
 
B. If knowledge were a pure public good, the only concern would be about the nature of the 
knowledge produced under the assumption that the business sector would direct its investment 
towards the more palatable areas for the market rather than those of greatest societal and 
scientific interest. But it would not create problems related to its social distribution and 
diffusion. However, the modern economics of science and innovation has rejected the idea that 
knowledge is a pure public good arguing that it has both private and public attributes (Callon, 
1994; Nelson, 1989; Pavitt, 1987) and that a different balance occurs for each component.  
Accepting the Arrow-Stiglitz view implies that knowledge is strictly non-excludable, while 
most of the industrial technology is largely firm-specific and it is difficult to be used elsewhere 
(Pavitt, 1987). At best, it depends on whether the focus is on generic knowledge or firm-specific 
knowledge. In the latter cases, when knowledge is about technological improvements that are 
very specific to the firm, knowledge is closer to a private good since it is easier for the firm to 
exclude others from using it (Nelson, 1989).  
Economic agents may be willing to invest resources to generate knowledge only if they 
expect that they profit from it. And this leads profit-seeking agents to use technical and 
institutional devices to exclude potential users from the utilization of the knowledge they have 
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generated. The literature on technological appropriation (Arundel, 2001; Cohen et al., 2000; 
Filippetti and Peyrache, 2011; 2015; Levin et al., 1987) has shown that there are a variety of 
methods, ranging from intellectual property rights to industrial secrecy that firms use to protect 
their inventive and innovative activities. 
Therefore, there is a basic difference between the knowledge promoted by the public and the 
business sectors. While the former is generated with the purpose to be widely disseminated and 
to be offered for use to most economic agents, the latter is financed taking into account that any 
result should be protected to make it as difficult as possible to imitate, replicate and disseminate 
it.3 Disclosure strategies work in the opposite direction. While researchers in the private sector 
keep their results as secret as possible, in the public sector researchers rush to disclose them to 
establish a priority, since the latter represents a key mechanism in public science to establish 
extra-rewards (Dasgupta and David, 1994). 
 
C. Other major differences arise when one considers the role of tacit knowledge. As well-known 
in every process of knowledge generation there is an explicit and a tacit component. While the 
former can be articulated and codified, the latter cannot (Cowan et al., 2000; Polanyi, 1966). 
This has great implication on the diffusion of knowledge. While explicit knowledge can be 
relatively easily transferred and re-used in different contexts, the process of tacit knowledge 
diffusion can take place only locally as it implies personal interactions. There are relevant 
differences between the public sector and the private sector to this regard. First, tacit knowledge 
is mostly associated to technical development, innovations, and improvements in production 
processes that take place within the firms. This not only reduces the share of codified 
knowledge diffused in the private sector, but also the opportunity to use the codified knowledge 
itself, since the application of such knowledge requires other tacit knowledge and more personal 
interaction (Faulkner et al., 1995). Conversely, by its very nature, the knowledge domain of 
basic research is formal (e.g. in the forms of experiments or computer simulations) and explicit. 
Results of research carried out in the public sector tend to be rigorously codified, as for instance 
into protocols or scientific articles, in order to be diffused, published and checked by the peer 
community. Second, even the tacit component of knowledge generated in the public sector is 
more likely to be diffused compared to that in the business sector. Therefore while it is true that 
both the public research and private research produce tacit knowledge, a major difference is that 
business companies do not diffuse it, while this is deliberately done in the public sector (Pavitt, 
1993).  
 
Similarities	   should	   not	   hide	   differences. There are, of course, some important similarities 
between privately-produced and publicly-produced knowledge. The fact that knowledge is not 
protected through intellectual property rights or industrial secrecy is not sufficient to allow users 
to benefit from it. From the user perspective, there is a basic difference between knowledge 
freely available from the knowledge that can be used without costs (as rightly noted by Callon, 
1994) and this applies to both public and business funded knowledge. Even when the 
                                                            
3 It is well known for example that even if a publication of a patent should in principle allow others to 
replicate the invention, in fact, companies are quite successful in making this unlikely. 
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knowledge is generated by public institutions that have the best intentions to diffuse it, this does 
not mean that potential users will be able to put it into practical use without sustaining 
additional costs devoted to learning and absorbing it. All the experience of technology transfer 
schemes shows that it is not enough that there is the intention of the producer to transfer the 
knowledge (Bozeman, 2000). Successful stories require that prospective users invest their own 
time and resources to absorb it through capacity building. Even when it is publicly funded and 
freely available, it is not a free meal. 
We also know that, in spite of all efforts made by companies to protect their knowledge with 
a mixture of industrial secrecy and intellectual property rights, it is very difficult to prevent 
competitors and the public at large to use the knowledge. The Coca-Cola receipt has been well 
kept confidential but this has not prevented competitors to bring to the market substitute 
products, and the same applies to results with a higher knowledge-base in industries such as 
pharmaceutical to ICTs. 
All prospective researchers and innovators build new knowledge on the shoulders of other 
previous researchers, drawing from the pool of knowledge that is socially available: the larger 
this pool of knowledge the greater the opportunities to explore new venues to solve.4 By 
contrast, if the pool of ideas that are publicity available is smaller, this will reduce the 
technological opportunity available. Further, this also serves as an important set of signals of 
where to search for finding effective solutions to technical problems, in that it also suggests 
indirectly what does not work (David, 1997).  
The business sector has been itself the greater benefiter of the public pool of knowledge. 
Nelson and Rosenberg (1994) have shown that that public R&D is not a substitute to business 
R&D, but rather an enhancer of it. Both the ICT industry and the bio-tech industry, the more 
innovative and dynamic industries over the past two decades, have enormously benefited from 
basic research done in the public sector (Guellec and Potterie, 2003; Mazzucato, 2013). Even 
big companies in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries that are provided with large R&D 
labs rely heavily on the results of basic research carried out in universities and public research 
centres (D’Este et al., 2013; Lane and Probert, 2007). In these industries, the intensity of 
university-industry collaborations precisely witnesses the importance that this pool of 
knowledge in the public sector plays for private companies. 
The pool of publicly available knowledge affects also the direction of research. To the extent 
that the private sector succeeds in excluding some parts of the knowledge pool, researchers and 
prospective innovators will be induced to look for venues in which it is easier (and less costly) 
to have access to knowledge to build on it. This is a typical case in the bio-tech, and particularly 
in gene-based research. In this area, research has to make extensive use of database creation, but 
genes have been heavily and effectively patented. As a result, drug companies have been pushed 
away from promising line of research towards those that are less problematic in terms of 
intellectual property (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998).  
                                                            
4 This point has been raised, interestingly enough, by Dosi and Stiglitz (2013) who define knowledge as a 
quasi-public good; see also Klevorick et al. (1995). For a review on the benefits of public research see 
also Salter and Martin (2001). 
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We have therefore learnt that: i) it is not enough that some knowledge is financed by the 
public sector to make it a pure public good, and ii) in spite of many attempts made by the 
business sector to limit the leak-out of knowledge they generated, companies do not manage to 
make it a pure private good. However, it cannot be ignored the presence of radical differences 
between the two components. Increasing the business component at the expenses of the public 
one has a simple and straightforward effect: the generation of knowledge is becoming more and 
more a competitive process where the main objectives is to exclude rather than include users 
and this is precisely the opposite of what dominated the republic of science for centuries. 
2. Sectors	  of	  financing	  and	  of	  performance	  of	  R&D	  
The financing of knowledge generation is not the only predictor of its public and private 
outcomes. It is possible to be more specific by taking into account also the nature of the 
organizations where this knowledge is developed. As already identified in the Frascati Manual 
(OECD, 2015), the public and the business sectors perform indoor a substantial amount of 
activities, but not all of what they fund. Since funding does not overlap entirely with execution, 
R&D expenditure is classified by the sectors of financing and of performance. In reality, there 
are significant linkages among the public and the business sectors that are not captured by a 
disjunctive classification about financing and performance. 
Figure 3 subdivides R&D expenditure in four main categories.5 In the first box we find the 
R&D financed by public sources and also performed in public institutions: it comprises what 
governments provide to universities and public labs ranging from NASA to NHS. Within the 
public sector, a further break-down between the R&D carried out in governmental research 
centres and universities can be made. In most countries, universities are public institutions, in a 
few countries they have special status (in the UK they are civil corporations), in several 
countries, including the USA and Japan, they can be both public and private. Besides the 
juridical details, universities are mostly committed to the non-commercial knowledge and 
therefore we classify their R&D expenditure as public. The fourth box reports what companies 
do with their own money. The predominant rationale to invest in R&D is to support products, 
processes and services sold in the market. Companies do it with internal resources as part of 
competitive behaviour and try to make the knowledge generated as excludable as possible. A 
large portion of this knowledge, however, generates fall-outs and welfare gains; business R&D 
creates a lot of externalities. 
 
Boxes two and three report the existence of interactions among public and business players 
that go beyond intellectual collaboration. On the one hand, the public sector often finances 
business R&D (Box 3) when it requires specific results or products which embody the 
                                                            
5 In fact, the OECD provides a more detailed statistical classification. The sector of financing, besides 
government and the business enterprises also includes R&D financed from abroad and from other 
national sources (comprising the non-profit sector). The sector of performance is further disaggregated in 
the business, higher education, government and private non-profit sectors. In order to obtain a two-by-two 
matrix which reflects the public-private sectors, government R&D and higher education R&D have been 
aggregated in table 4. 
 14	  
knowledge. Cases of public procurement include government grants to business corporations to 
obtain military, space, medical or ICTs objectives. In other occasions, governments support the 
innovative activities of their companies for the positive externalities generated by business 
R&D. More often, governments support business performed R&D since this helps to foster their 
economic competitiveness, especially against foreign competitors. Conversely, Universities and 
other public research centres are more and more willing to carry out R&D for the business 
sector (Box 2). 
 
Fig.	  3	  -­‐	  R&D	  by	  sector	  of	  financing	  and	  sector	  of	  performance	  
 
Source:	  Authors	  elaboration	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  OECD	  (2002).	  
Table 4 reports the subdivision of R&D resources according to the criteria indicated in 
Figure 2 for eight OECD countries for 1981 and 2012. This allows following how the 
composition of R&D expenditure has changed across different national innovation systems. 
 
Box	  1	  –	  Publicly	  funded	  and	  performed	  R&D. These resources are directly steered by public 
priorities and should correspond to the generation of pure public goods since the government 
target is to disseminate as much as possible the outcome of R&D programmes to the public at 
large and should therefore aim to remove barriers to acquire the new expertise. The landing on 
the moon in the 1960s and the war on cancer in 1970s, just to cite two major US science policy 
priorities, were mostly carried out with publicly funded and performed R&D and large part of 
the outcomes were made publicly available. 
Table 4 shows a drop of the share publicly funded and performed R&D in the period 1981-
2012. The decrease has occurred in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the US. By, contrast, 
it has remained stable in Italy and the UK. A simple average among these countries (excluding 
South Korea) indicates that the share of the public-public R&D expenditure drops from 37.5% 
to 33.1%. 
The reduction of the share of publicly funded and performed R&D should raise concern: the 
benefits of knowledge in the next decades will be lower and there is the risk that what the 
populace perceive as major priorities, especially in fields such as health and environment will 
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get lower resources than they should be. Even in terms of sustaining business opportunities, it 
should be reminded that entire industries, including ICTs and Bio-tech, started from a few basic 
discoveries and inventions done in the public sector and that have been developed and 
commercialized, sometimes after decades, within companies (see Mazuccato, 2013). The 
scientific openings generated by public R&D have often stimulated companies to carry out 
commercial follow-ups finalized to introduce technological innovations, thus also contributing 
to the expansion of total R&D expenditure (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994). 
Can publicly funded and performed R&D be subtracted to the public domain and therefore 
lose some of the properties of pure public good? This depends very much from the objectives 
and strategies carried out by the government; research associated to military and security 
objectives has traditionally been kept out from the public domain. But also civilian R&D can be 
subtracted to the public domain: since the Bayh-Dole act was approved in the 1980, the US 
government has allowed individual scientists and Universities to privatize inventions made with 
public funding through IPRs. The number of patents taken by Universities has steadily 
increased, making the use of publicly funded knowledge more often excludable than before 
(Lissoni et al., 2008). 
After the Bayh-Dole was introduced in the USA, several other countries have imitated it 
(Archibugi and Filippetti, 2010; Grimaldi et al., 2011). The supporters of the Bayh-Dole act 
argue that this privatisation of publicly funded knowledge has increased the dissemination: by 
providing an additional incentive besides the academic glory, it is more likely that the results 
achieved are not kept sleeping, and that academic inventors actively seek opportunities to 
deliver the outcomes to the market and to society at large (Geuna and Rossi, 2011). The Bayh-
Dole legislation is an attempt to transform inventions into innovations, to motivate academe to 
be more active in technology transfer and empirical analyses have confirmed its effectiveness. 
Publicly funded and performed R&D is the closest to be a pure public good. The economic 
benefits of knowledge will not be collected if it is reduced. To promote the maximum diffusion, 
actions for capacity building in prospective users should be combined to policies that transfer 
IPRs to inventors. 
 
Box	   2	   –	   Business	   funded	   and	   publicly	   performed	   R&D. It is good news when companies 
finance research in universities and public research centres. Often, companies require and obtain 
that the outcome of the R&D is kept confidential. Even if the results are non-rivalrous, firms 
can obtain that the public contractor makes them excludable, at least in the short and medium 
term. Activities following in this box belong may be beneficial to the contracting firm only. 
The data indicate that big money is not involved. On average, the share of this type of 
research grows from 1.5% to a modest 2%. Canada and Germany show larger increases, passing 
respectively from 1.4% to 3.7% and 0.4 and 4.2%. A moderate growth arises also in France, 
while the UK confirms a relative importance of the business as a source of funding for the 
public research sector. The US shows very low values, 0.4% in 1981 and 0.7% in 2012 
suggesting that the Silicon Valley model is a rather limited phenomenon. 
Within this component, it is possible to identify a vicious and a virtuous circle. The vicious 
circle occurs when public institutions are forced to replace the traditional sources of public 
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funding with business sources. This has often been denounced because it leads public 
institutions to abandon basic research programmes to carry out testing, measurements, provision 
of standards and other very practical activities to support themselves. If Universities and public 
centres are too much obsessed with fund-raising, they can lose their original social function and 
be transformed in academic capitalist firms (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997), impoverishing the 
advancement of knowledge. The virtuous circle, on the contrary, occurs when the business 
sector is attracted to the public institutions because the latter has a unique set of competences 
and has generated major scientific discoveries and advances that could be used for business 
opportunities. However, both the critics (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997) and the enthusiasts 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000) of the university-business integration seems to largely 
overestimate the phenomenon. In spite of the variations across universities and scientific fields 
(Rossi and Rosli, 2015), on the aggregate business penetration in Universities is quantitatively 
rather limited. 
 
Box	   3	   –	   Publicly	   funded	   and	   business	   performed	   R&D. When the government provides 
funding to business R&D, both criteria of rivalry and excludability are blurred. In terms of 
rivalry, companies compete in order to secure the public grants and the outcome is used in a 
competitive environment. We are in a typical case where there is competition for the market 
even when there is no rivalry in consumption. Excludability is very much specific to the way 
programmes are designed: in some cases, the government requires that the outcome is kept 
confidential (as in the case of military procurement) and therefore the performing enterprise can 
exclude potential rivals from the benefits. In other cases, the government requires that the 
knowledge is properly disseminated. In both cases the performing organization has some 
advantages over competitors since it has a deeper understanding and often also lead time over 
what it originally generated. 
A generalized reduction of the public sector financing the business enterprises has occurred. 
On average (again excluding South Korea), the share drops from 11.7% in 1981 to 4.5% in 
2012. This dynamic, considered along the drop in the public-public box, reflects a generalized 
reduction in the public funding for R&D across virtually every country. The drop has been 
substantial in the US, where the share shrunk from 21.3% to 8.8%; in Germany, from 11.9% to 
3.1%; and in France, from 15.5% to 5.6%. Part of this reflects the general reduction of defence 
expenditure at the end of the cold war. 
Why should the public sector opt to finance R&D carried out in the business sector rather 
than internally? A first justification is that the business sector is better equipped to provide the 
expected outcome. This is a justification often provided when, for example, defence-related 
contracts are assigned to corporations. The second reason is that governments are not 
particularly interested in specific outcomes but wish to use R&D as an industrial policy tool 
with the aim to make companies more competitive, especially in front of foreign competitors. 
The third is that there is the hope that, if funded by the public sector, business companies will 
expand their own investment and therefore the societal investment in knowledge will be higher 
than what is provided by the government. Finally, thanks to public support companies should be 
more willing to undertake projects that otherwise would have not undertaken due to a high rate 
 17	  
of risk and uncertainty, or long-term expected outcomes. To this respect public policy would 
provide additional R&D carried out in the business sector.  
Business and public (higher education + government) share of R&D by sector of 
performance and source of funds, 1981 and 2012 (selected countries) 
 
Table	  4	  
 
Source:	  authors’	  elaboration	  on	  OECD	  R&D	  Statistics.	  The	   total	  amount	  of	  R&D	  expenditure	  has	  been	  
calculated	  summing	  three	  main	  three	  sources	  of	  funding,	  namely	  government,	  higher	  education	  and	  the	  
business	  sector.	  For	  South	  Korea	  data	  refer	  to	  1995	  instead	  of	  1981.	   	  
CANADA
1981 2012
public business public business
public 51.0% 5.5% public 45.1% 2.3%
business 1.4% 42.1% business 3.7% 49.0%
FRANCE
1981 2012
public business public business
public 41.0% 15.5% public 33.7% 5.6%
business 0.7% 42.8% business 1.8% 59.0%
GERMANY
1981 2012
public business public business
public 30.3% 11.9% public 27.6% 3.1%
business 0.4% 57.4% business 4.2% 65.2%
ITALY
1981 2012
public business public business
public 43.4% 5.1% public 44.8% 4.4%
business 1.1% 50.4% business 1.3% 49.5%
JAPAN
1981 2012
public business public business
public 36.4% 1.2% public 21.7% 0.9%
business 0.4% 62.0% business 0.5% 76.9%
SOUTH KOREA
1995 2012
public business public business
public 19.4% 2.7% public 19.3% 4.8%
business 4.8% 73.1% business 1.5% 74.4%
UNITED STATES
1981 2012
public business public business
public 28.0% 21.3% public 26.7% 8.8%
business 0.4% 50.3% business 0.7% 63.8%
UNITED KINGDOM
1981 2012
public business public business
public 32.5% 21.2% public 32.5% 6.7%
business 3.0% 43.3% business 2.8% 58.0%
source of funds
sector of performance
source of funds
sector of performance
source of funds
sector of performance
sector of performance
source of funds
sector of performance
source of funds
sector of performance
source of funds
sector of performance
source of funds
sector of performance
source of funds
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The three issues need to be proven. First, if there is a problem of efficiency and efficacy in 
the publicly performed R&D, this should be addressed by revising the incentives and the 
organization of the public sector rather than by moving out of it. Second, to concentrate on the 
total amount of R&D rather than on its direction is a major mistake. Common sense suggests 
that too much scientific investigation is carried out in cosmetics while too little in vaccines. In 
the medical area, it is often denounced the distortion of scientific research towards areas that are 
more profitable rather than useful. Third, investigations about the effects of public funding to 
business R&D have provided uncertain results and in some cases it seems that an increase in 
public funding has even generated a reduction of firms’ own investment (Antonelli et al., 2012; 
David et al., 2000). 
 
Box	  4	  –	  Business	  funded	  and	  performed	  R&D. Through their investment, the business sector 
has generated over the centuries an enormous amount of knowledge that has benefitted society, 
often contributing also to basic research (Nelson, 1959; Rosenberg, 1990). Transistors and 
semiconductors, drugs and medical devices have been generated by profit-seeking organizations 
and have considerably increased well-being and development.  
Business funded and performed R&D rose from 49.8% in 1981 to 60.2% in 2012. The increase 
in the share of business-business is particularly significant in Canada, France, Japan, the US and 
the UK. The countries in which this share is larger are the two Asian economies, Japan and 
South Korea, witnessing the importance that historically private enterprises have played in 
sustaining their innovation-drive growth. Canada and Italy have a share that accounts for less 
than 50%. 
We expect that firms protect the knowledge they generate and make an effort to create some 
fences to appropriate the returns of their investment and to prevent competitors to use it without 
payment. First, companies manage to keep exclusive command of their knowledge, through a 
combination of industrial secrecy and IPRs, for limited periods of time only. Industrial secrets 
are penetrated in due course through reverse engineering, mobility of scientists and engineers, 
simultaneous discoveries and many other ways. Patents do not impede the possibility to invent 
around, and anyhow they have a limited time-span. The fact that most of the patents are not 
even renewed shows how quickly the frontier of knowledge moves (De Rassenfosse et al., 
2013). Of course, the disclosure of information is not enough to allow competitors to put into 
practice the knowledge available: they will need to invest their own time and resources to do 
that successfully. But the fences available to firms to protect their own intellectual property are 
much weaker than those of any other form of property. 
Second, in order to sustain their knowledge base, firms need to acquire information from a 
variety of sources, public and commercial. Failure to do that may lead to put into production 
obsolete, misleading or sub-optimal knowledge. In order to acquire information, firms also need 
to share knowledge with others. The evidence on strategic technological agreements shows that 
companies share and even develop core competences with competitors (Narula and Martinez-
Noya, 2015). Moreover, even the individual scientists and engineers within companies are often 
part of circles of experts where information is exchanged on a voluntary basis and following the 
standard of communication typical of the academic community (von Hippel, 1987). The open 
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innovation model, which has become so popular over the last decade, has clearly indicated that 
the sources to innovate are varied and that it is not in the interest of an enterprise to keep its 
knowledge development segregated from the wider realm of knowledge (Chesbrough et al., 
2008). 
These facts have important policy implications. The public sector could considerably concur 
to increase the knowledge generation of the business sector by producing good and accessible 
knowledge which could be used by businesses in a competitive environment. The necessity of 
the business sector to share and exchange knowledge with other knowledge-intensive sectors 
and even with competitors, need to be further enhanced through public policies. It would, for 
example, suggests that rather than to provide public funding to individual firms (distorting 
competition), the public sector would better devote its resources to promote open centres, such 
as science parks, where all knowledge intensive players, business and private, could exchange 
the knowledge at their disposal. 
3. Three	  implications	  
Using the public goods framework and the OECD classification of sector of funding and 
execution has allowed highlighting some trends that have often been ignored in recent science 
and innovation policy analysis. This has some implications also some of the recent theorizing 
about innovation. 
 
Interactions	   are	   good,	   but	   the	   institutional	   nature	   of	   players	   should	   be	   preserved	   – The 
emphasis that the economics of science and technology has put for the last twenty years on the 
interactions (using often a large number of terms such as: networks, clusters, public/private 
partnerships, milieu and others), should not hide the fact that public and business players have 
different incentive mechanisms and priorities which should be preserved. The changing 
composition of R&D expenditure provoked by the retreat of the public sphere on the one hand 
and the growth of business investment on the other hand, has already generated and will 
continue to generate long term consequences in the republic of knowledge. It should therefore 
be reaffirmed the idea that the main purpose of the public sector is to promote and disseminate 
good knowledge addressing socially relevant issues. Interactions cannot by themselves be a 
substitute for public funding. Once this basic principle is affirmed, interactions with the 
business world are welcomed, especially if they are designed to enhance the societal priorities 
dictated by the government. In fact, personal collaboration has been recognized as a major 
channel of knowledge transfer between universities and companies (Economic Insight, 2015). 
R&D data show a clear pattern: the bulk of the research is both funded and performed either 
in the public or in the private sector, while the cross-funding between them is scarce and 
declined. Inasmuch as who puts the money decides the priorities, this result is consistent with 
our normative view that the priorities of the public and business sector should be kept separated. 
We are not claiming that university and industry should not collaborate. Quite the contrary, the 
fact that the business sector is massively investing in R&D creates the ideal conditions for the 
industry itself to be able to absorb and benefit by collaborating with the public research and by 
technology transfer. It is in fact well know that R&D carried out in the private sector is a 
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necessary condition to interact and learn from the basic research conducted in universities 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Pavitt, 1993).  
Therefore, reducing the public funding to basic research will ultimately also reduce the 
returns for the industry itself. This has to be taken into account when great emphasis is put on 
the argument that applied research or market-let research is important to fuel countries’ 
competitiveness. While this can be true in the short run, a generalized reduction of basic 
research will eventually impoverish the sources of competitiveness of the industry. The current 
trend about the shrinking of public R&D can hence have major negative impact also on 
countries’ dynamic efficiency. The dominance of China in the renewable energy technology 
sector is a case in point. In a few years, China has become the world leader in this sector 
boosted by massive investment in research funded by the public sector. Today, out of fifteen 
public research centres across the world, nine are Chinese, with the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences featuring as the world’s number one public centre (KIK Innoenergy, 2015). Further, 
public funding to the private sector has often generated concerns for antitrust policies. Close 
relationship between the public and private sector can in fact create a number of problems both 
in terms of antitrust policies, but also in terms of possible moral hazard and other forms of 
opportunistic behaviours. A final comment concerns the crowding-in or crowding-out effects of 
public funded research on private research: the more government funds public research close to 
the market, the higher the risk of a crowding-out effect on business R&D. By contrast, funding 
public pure research is more likely to lead to crowding-in effect, thus maximising the economic 
benefits stemming from the complementarity between public and private research. 
 
Back	  to	  the	  linear	  model?	  – The considerations made above may lead to revaluate the linear 
model of innovation, which was so influential in the 1950s and 1960s. According to this model, 
there were logical links between the initial stages of knowledge development, mostly carried out 
by Universities and other public centres in the form of basic research, and the final stages of 
commercialization, carried out by profit-seeking companies (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). This 
model is too schematic to guide science policy and, inasmuch as business innovation is 
concerned, has been replaced with models that privilege interactions at different stages of the 
knowledge-chain and across the various players. When addressing the SPRU 25th anniversary 
Conference, Nathan Rosenberg (1991) proudly declared that “the linear model is death”, and for 
sure the audience he was lecturing (and Rosenberg himself) contributed to go beyond a rigid 
notion of how innovation develops. Nearly a quarter of a century has passed since this seminal 
conference. Over this period, much evidence has been produced on the relevance of loops, 
interactions, connections and feed-backs from the different stages of knowledge development 
(Caraça et al., 2009). 
But the overemphasis on the importance of loops and the corresponding belittlement of the 
linear model (Balconi et al., 2010) also had the consequence of neglecting the trend we have 
singled out above. Short-termism has contaminated also the republic of knowledge that, by 
definition, provides its best outcome when is long-sighted. 
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Knowledge	   in	   the	   global	   arena	   – We have, so far, discussed the issue with reference to 
individual nations. But, of course, global interactions are the norm in the realm of knowledge 
(Archibugi and Filippetti, 2015a). Academe always had the propensity to share knowledge 
across borders and formal and informal contacts among scholars working in the same issues 
have been the norm (Heitor, 2015; Hennemann and Liefner, 2015). Over the last decades similar 
trends have occurred also within the business community (Cantwell and Molero, 2003; 
Iammarino and McCann, 2013, 2015). R&D intensive companies have increased their 
propensity to locate their facilities in more than one country, creating intra-firm but inter-
national networks. International strategic technology agreements have dramatically increased 
since the 1980s showing that companies are more willing than generally expected to share their 
know-how with competitors (Narula and Martinez-Noya, 2015). 
In a world of blurred frontiers and where the national dimension of individual companies is 
more and more identifiable, governments should seriously re-think also their industrial policy 
based on innovation incentives. The more convincing strategy seems to enhance the capabilities 
within their territories, upgrading R&D infrastructures and training of qualified personnel. In 
their investment decisions, companies seem to be more attracted by these local capabilities than 
by cash incentives.  
Governments would carry out their function much better through public international 
cooperation programmes rather than by supporting companies, especially if they are directed to 
pre-competitive R&D that could deliver global social benefits. An excellent example is the 
World Health Organization programme to eradicate small-pox (Fenner et al., 1988). The 
programme cost was rather moderate (about 300 million US dollars), it helped to eradicate a 
disease in developing as well as developed countries and contributed to create medical 
infrastructures in countries that desperately needed them. Such a programme took place between 
1967 and 1980 and it is sad to note that in the last 35 years it is difficult to find another 
comparable and successful programme aimed to generate comparable knowledge-based global 
public goods. 
4. Discussion	  and	  conclusions	  
This article has discussed a series of facts that are not sufficiently addressed in science and 
technology policy: the public component of research has been reduced, while the business 
component is flourishing. On the ground of an analytical distinction which identifies the 
economic characteristics of knowledge produced in the public sector and knowledge produced 
in the private sector, we have explained why this trend might generate long-term adverse 
consequences. First of all, because there is no guarantee that market-led opportunities 
correspond to societal needs and priorities. Second, because an excessive privatisation of 
knowledge reduces the possibilities of diffusing knowledge. Third, because long-term 
technological opportunities, especially when they are radical, are often associated to major 
scientific break-troughs generated by basic research carried out in public institutions. This has 
happened with electricity and chemicals, ICTs and pharmaceuticals, the global positioning 
system and the internet, and there is no specific reasons why this should not be happening again, 
provided governments are willing to properly support public research. 
 22	  
Our analysis covers a long span of time in which major changes have occurred in the way in 
which research is carried out and in the role of knowledge in contemporary societies. 
Knowledge has become the main engine of economic competitiveness of both states and 
companies, and, as a result, R&D represents the main source of comparative advantage. 
Looking at the data for 1981 and 2013 we are comparing two different worlds. The Triple Helix 
studies suggested that the real of knowledge has gone through major changes and that 
universities, industries, and governments had greater interactions among them (Leydesdorff and 
Etzkowitz, 1996). To what extent is this reflected in data on R&D? In principle, this should be 
evident by looking at our hybrid boxes (see figure 3, box 2 and 3) where the business sector and 
the public sector (both universities and governments) are financing the research expenditure of 
each other. However, it arises that the share of R&D expenditure financed by the private sector 
and performance by the public sector is still negligible. Further, the share of R&D expenditure 
financed by the public sector and performed in the industry has shrunk considerably. If the 
interactions envisaged by the aforementioned studies are that relevant, they could be only in 
collaboration which do not imply cross-financing between the public sector and the business 
sector.  
A great shift in the realm of the production of knowledge was already anticipated and 
advocated, among others, by Gibbons et al. (1994). They claimed that a new mode of 
knowledge generation is increasingly produced close to the context of application. The business 
sector has a key role here in consequence of the intensification of international competition. In 
this sense, the trend about the relative decline of public research that we have outlined here was 
already predicted. In a rather explicit language, Gibbons et al. argued that “this transformation is 
one of the more far-reaching […] because it involves drawing the universities into the heart of 
the commercial process” (Gibbons et al., 1994, p. 86). According to this view, the increased 
pressure of social accountability of publicly-financed scientific research has encouraged to 
move from curiosity-driven research on fundamental principles towards research closer to the 
context of application. This has changed the setting of research priorities that are, according to 
the authors, more adherent to social needs in terms of having greater wealth potential and 
greater impact on countries’ competitiveness. This conclusion seems to be at odd with our claim 
about the risk that the shift towards the privatization of knowledge bears precisely on setting 
priorities that are less desirable from a social welfare standpoint.  
Two comments are in order here. The first is that shifting the research priorities from 
fundamental knowledge towards more applied context does not necessarily generate higher 
wealth creation and long-term economic growth. Concerns about the slowdown of innovation 
and technological progress have been raised recently, among the others, by Robert Gordon’s 
work (2012). In his influential book, Tyler Cowen (2002) argues that in the early 20th century 
there were many “low hanging fruits” for the world economy to collect such as antibiotics, 
electricity-powered factories, radio, TV, planes and automobiles. But these have all been 
exploited. As we run out of low hanging fruit, the argument goes, we are likely to run out of 
rapid technological progress and growth will slow down. Crucially, most of these hanging fruits 
have been the results of major break-through in basic research. In fact, fundamental research 
carried out in public bodies is still delivering substantial technological innovation to the 
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business sector. A recent research on the European Laboratory for Particle Physics (CERN) 
shows a great impact of CERN over technological innovation in the business sectors across the 
most disparate industries, from medicine to electronics, including technologies for cancer 
therapy, photovoltaic cells, and x-ray (Le Goff, 2011). 
The second comment is that social accountability can be defined in different ways. Gibbons 
et al. (1994) seem to interpret this in terms of activity that generate higher economic payoff, for 
example by rising competitiveness and economic growth. Others would leave the choice to the 
market, trusting that “The market place does not worship false idols, it makes empirically 
correct judgments” (Kealey, 1996, pp. 344–45). We instead see social accountability more in 
terms of the process of priority setting. In our view fundamental public research has a better 
bearing on social desirability when the priorities are set through a political process, which, 
ultimately, has to be accountable to the society within the democratic process. 
According to the collaborative science argument, we are witnessing a paramount paradigm 
shift in the way science is carried out (Nielsen, 2012). The major driver is the World Wide Web 
that is making possible to connect not only scientists, but also amateur citizens, that can 
contribute to substantial advancements in science thanks to an unprecedented mass of data and a 
distributed and amplified form of collective intelligence. A crucial factor to unleash the 
potential of this new pattern of collaborative science is the possibility to make an increasing 
mass of information (e.g. big data, measurements, results of experiments, etc.) freely available 
and accessible across the whole world. Here the possibility to spread knowledge and 
information at a cost close to zero is the condition sine qua non for further encouraging the 
democratization of science, while the presence of proprietary forms of IPRs can act as a 
deterrent (David, 2004).The risk of a privatization of knowledge and information, or a “Second 
Enclosure Movement” has been also discussed with relation to knowledge-as-a-common view, 
actually by another Nobel Prize winner, namely Elinor Ostrom together with other scholars 
(Boyle, 2003; Hess and Ostrom, 2006). These studies focus on the accessibility characteristic of 
knowledge as a common, in particular claiming the presence of new risks associated to new 
technologies that can enable the capture of what were once free and open public goods. We 
have outlined a similar risk in relation to private-generated knowledge that puts in place a 
number of strategies to artificially increase the excludability of knowledge. We share the same 
policy concern: public policy should refrain to use intellectual property in these cases, while it 
should instead encourage open science through the creation of public open platform to share 
basic information, such as for example data and basic knowledge. 
This discussion is also related to the much heated current debate on the financing of basic 
research. A techno-libertarian view, recently exemplified by Matt Ridley (2015), argues that 
innovation is not the result of basic science; quite the contrary, advancements in technological 
applications close to the market drive research in basic science: “Deep scientific insights are the 
fruits that fall from the tree of technological change”. If this was the case, there would be no 
scope for government intervention to support innovation; at best, “they can only make sure that 
they don’t hinder it” (Ridley, 2015) since the industry could do it better itself. An opposite view 
will on the contrary defend the need of a republic of knowledge and, on the ground of a whole 
bunch of historical examples, stresses that basic science is indeed crucial for technological 
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developments (David, 1997; Mazzucato, 2013). We have here argued that it makes a great 
difference if basic science is carried out in the public sector or by business companies and that 
this has profound impact on the long-term rate of innovation, economic growth and social 
welfare. 
We are not blind in front of the several problems that is facing publicly funded and 
performed R&D. There is a traditional propensity of academia to close itself into the Ivory 
Tower and to ignore economic and social life. These issues should be addressed and there is 
room, through a revision of the incentives and the organization of scientific research, to improve 
the current situation. But the retreat of the public from the real of knowledge is not the solution; 
on the contrary it is aggravating the problem because it forces universities and research centres 
to please the market, something they are not very good at, while making more difficult what 
they should be able to do at best, namely to generate good and useful knowledge accessible to 
all society. 
We are also aware that promoting public research for industrial competitiveness is easier to 
sell from policy makers, especially in periods of dire financial straits, also as a consequence of 
the recent economic crisis.6 The support for public R&D by means of taxpayers’ money is a 
delicate matter, since it includes a sacrifice today for future and uncertain benefits, mostly 
accruing to citizens indirectly. This issue is explicit in the recent emphasis on the impact for the 
society that researchers applying for a research grant of the European Commission should be 
able to strictly demonstrate. However, it is also true that bad times can represent good windows 
of opportunities to pursue substantial political shifts (Drazen and Grilli, 1993). 
There is great scope for future research, both quantitative and qualitative, both to delve into 
the quantitative shift of research as well as major changes in the nature of research carried out 
for the public interest. In a world in which Google is carrying out research on artificial 
intelligence and biotechnologies, large NGOs like the Bill and Melinda Foundation funds 
research on vaccines and HIV to improve health conditions in developing countries, there is a 
lot to do to study the positive economics of public research as well as the normative 
prescriptions of science policy. We hope to have contributed to shed some light on a major trend 
that has occurred over the past three decades which has to be taken into account in designing 
appropriate science, technology and innovation policies.  
 
 
 
  
                                                            
6 In fact both public and private R&D have been reduced as a result of the crisis (Filippetti and Archibugi 
2011). 
 25	  
References	  
Antonelli, C., Crespi, F., Scellato, G. (2012). Inside innovation persistence: New evidence from 
Italian micro-data. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 23, 4, 341–353. 
Archibugi, D., Filippetti, A. (2010). The globalisation of intellectual property rights: Four 
learned lessons and four theses. Global Policy, 1, 137-149. 
Archibugi, D., Filippetti, A. (eds.), (2015a). The Handbook of Global Science, Technology and 
Innovation. Wiley, Oxford 
Archibugi, D., Filippetti, A. (2015b). Knowledge as a global public good. Pp. 479-503 in 
Archibugi, D., Filippetti, A. (eds.), The Handbook of Global Science, Technology and 
Innovation. Wiley, Oxford 
Arrow, K., (1962). Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention, in: Nelson, 
R.R. (Ed.), The Rate and Direction of the Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Arundel, A., (2001). The relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy for appropriation. 
Research Policy 30, 611–624. 
Balconi, M., Brusoni, S., Orsenigo, L., (2010). In defence of the linear model: An essay. 
Research Policy 39, 1–13. 
Boyle, J., (2003). The second enclosures movement and the construction of the public domain. 
Law and Contemporary Problems 66, 33–74. 
Bozeman, B., (2000). Technology transfer and public policy: a review of research and theory. 
Research Policy 29, 627–655. 
Callon, M., (1994). Is science a public good? Science, Technology, & Human Values 19, 395–
424. 
Cantwell, J., Molero, J., eds., (2003). Multinational Corporations, Innovative Strategies and 
Systems of Innovation. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Glos. 
Caraça, J., Lundvall, B.-Å., Mendonça, S., (2009). The changing role of science in the 
innovation process: From Queen to Cinderella? Technological Forecasting and Social Change 
76, 861–867. 
Chesbrough, H., Vanhaverbeke, W., West, J., (2008). Open Innovation. Researching a New 
Paradigm. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Cohen, W.M., Levinthal, D.A., (1990). Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and 
innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly 35, 128–152. 
Cohen, W.M., Nelson, R.R., Walsh, J.P., (2000). Protecting their intellectual assets: 
Appropriability conditions and why US manufacturing firms patent (or not). NBER Working 
Paper 7552. 
Colombo, MG, Grilli, L, Piscitello L., eds., (2011). Science and Innovation Policy for the New 
Knowledge Economy. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 26	  
Conceicao, P., Heitor, M.V., Sirilli, G., Wilson, R., (2004). The “Swing of Pendulum” from 
public to market support for science and technology: is the U.S. leading the way? Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change 71, 553–578. 
Cowan, R., David, P.A., Foray, D., (2000). The explicit economics of knowledge. codification 
and tacitness. Industrial and Corporate Change 9, 212–253. 
Cowen, T., (2002). Creative Destruction: How Globalization Is Changing the World's Cultures. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Crespi F. Quatraro, F., (2012). Systemic technology policies: Issues and instruments. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 80, 8, 1447–1449. 
Dasgupta, P., David, P.A., (1994). Towards a new economics of science. Research Policy 23, 
487–521. 
David, P.A., (2004). Can “open science” be protected from the evolving regime of IPR 
protections? Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Staatswissenschaft 160, 9–34. 
David, P.A., (1997. From market magic to calypso science policy. A review of Terence 
Kealey’s The economic laws of scientific research. Research Policy 26, 229–255. 
David, P.A., Hall, B., Toole, A.A., (2000. Is public R&D a complement or substitute for private 
R&D? A review of the econometric evidence. Research Policy 29, 497–529. 
Deiaco, E., Hughes, A., McKelvey, M., (2012). Universities as strategic actors in the knowledge 
economy. Cambridge Journal of Economics 36, 525–541. 
De Rassenfosse, G., Dernis, H., Guellec, D., Picci, L., de la Potterie, B. van P., (2013). The 
worldwide count of priority patents: A new indicator of inventive activity. Research Policy 42, 
720–737. 
D’Este, P., Guy, F., Iammarino, S., (2013). Shaping the formation of university–industry 
research collaborations: what type of proximity does really matter? Journal of Economic 
Geography 13, 537–558. 
Dinges, M., Berger, M., Frietsch, R., Kaloudis, A., (2007). Monitoring sector specialisation of 
public and private funded business research and development. Science and Public Policy 34, 
431–443. 
Dosi, G., Stiglitz, J.E., (2013). The role of intellectual property rights in the development 
process. LEM Working Paper Series November. 
Drazen, A., Grilli, V., (1993). The benefit of crises for economic reforms. The American 
Economic Review 83, 598–607. 
Economic Insight, (2015). What is the relationship between public and private investment in 
science, research and innovation? A Report commissioned by the Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills. London. 
Etzkowitz, H., Leydesdorff, L., (2000). The dynamics of innovation: from National Systems and 
“Mode 2” to a Triple Helix of university–industry–government relations. Research Policy 29, 
109–123. 
 27	  
Faulkner, W., Senker, J., Velho, L., (1995). Knowledge frontiers. Clarendon Press; Oxford 
University Press. 
Fenner, F., Henderson, D.A., Arita, I., Jezek, Z., Ladnyi, I.D., others, (1988). Smallpox and its 
Eradication. WHO, Geneva. 
Filippetti, A., Archibugi, D., (2011). Innovation in times of crisis: National System of 
Innovation, structure and demand. Research Policy 40, 179–192. 
Filippetti, A., Peyrache, A. (2011). The patterns of technological capabilities of countries: a dual 
approach using composite indicators and data envelopment analysis. World Development 39, 
1108-1121. 
Filippetti, A, Peyrache, A. (2015). Labour Productivity and Technology Gap in European 
Regions: A Conditional Frontier Approach. Regional Studies 49, 532-554. 
Gander, J.P., (1986). The economics of university-industry research linkages. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change 29, 33–49. 
Geuna, A., Rossi, F., (2011). Changes to university IPR regulations in Europe and the impact on 
academic patenting. Research Policy 40, 1068–1076. 
Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P., Trow, M., (1994). The 
New Production of Knowledge: The dynamics of science and research in contemporary 
societies. Sage, London. 
Gillies, D., (2015). Serendipity and Chance in Scientific Discovery. Pp. 525–539 in: Archibugi, 
D., Filippetti, A. (eds.), The Handbook of Global Science, Technology, and Innovation. Wiley 
Blackwell, Oxford. 
Godin, B., (2006). The linear model of innovation. Science, Technology & Human Values 31, 
639–667. 
Gordon, R.J., (2012). Is U.S. Economic Growth Over? Faltering Innovation Confronts the Six 
Headwinds. (Working Paper No. 18315). National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
MA. 
Grimaldi, R., Kenney, M., Siegel, D.S., Wright, M., (2011). 30 years after Bayh–Dole: 
Reassessing academic entrepreneurship. Research Policy 40, 1045–1057. 
Guellec, D., Potterie, B.V.P.D.L., (2003). The impact of public R&D expenditure on business 
R&D. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 12, 225–243. 
Havas, A., (2008). Devising futures for universities in a multi-level structure: A methodological 
experiment. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 75, 558–582.  
Heitor, M., 2015). How university global partnerships may facilitate a new era of international 
affairs and foster political and economic relations. Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change 95, 276–293. 
Heller, M.A., Eisenberg, R.S., (1998). Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research. Science 280, 698–701. 
 28	  
Hennemann, S., Liefner, I. (2015). Global Science Collaboration. Pp. 343-363 in D. Archibugi, 
D., Filippetti, A. (eds.), The Handbook of Global Science, Technology and Innovation. Wiley, 
Oxford. 
Hess, C., Ostrom, E., (2006). Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to 
Practice. The Mit Press, Cambridge MA. 
Hsu, D.W.L., Shen, Y.-C., Yuan, B.J.C., Chou, C.J., (2015). Toward successful 
commercialization of university technology: Performance drivers of university technology 
transfer in Taiwan. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 92, 25–39.  
Iammarino, S., McCann, P., (2013). Multinationals and Economic Geography: Location, 
Technology and Innovation. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Iammarino, S., McCann, P., (2013). Multinational enterprises Innovative Networks and the role 
of cities. Pp. 290-312 in D. Archibugi, D., Filippetti, A. (eds.), The Handbook of Global 
Science, Technology and Innovation. Wiley, Oxford. 
Kealey, T., (1996). The Economic Laws of Scientific Research. Cambridge Univ Press. 
KIK Innoenergy, (2015). Top 10 Energy Innovators in 100 Energy Priorities. Accessible at: 
http://www.kic-innoenergy.com/top-10-energy-innovators-in-100-energy-priorities/.  
Klevorick, A.K., Levin, R.C., Nelson, R.R., Winter, S.G., (1995). On the sources and 
significance of interindustry differences in technological opportunities. Research Policy 24, 
185–205. 
Kline, S.J., Rosenberg, N., (1986). An Overview of Innovation, in: Landau, R., Rosenberg, N. 
(eds.), The Positive Sum Strategy. National Academy Press, Washington D.C. 
Lane, C., Probert, J., (2007). The external sourcing of technological knowledge by US 
pharmaceutical companies: Strategic goals and inter‐organizational relationships. Industry & 
Innovation 14, 5–25. doi:10.1080/13662710601130574 
Lawton Smith, H., Bagchi-Sen, S., (2010). Triple helix and regional development: a perspective 
from Oxfordshire in the UK. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 22, 805–818.  
Le Goff, J.M., (2011). The impact of CERN on high tech industry developments. Focus: The 
construction of the LHC. Presented at the Workshop: Research infrastructures for industrial 
innovation, European Commission, Brussels. 
Levin, R. C., Klevorick, A. K., Nelson, R., Winter, S. (1987) 'Appropriating the returns from 
industrial Research and Development', Brookings Paper on Economic Activity, 3, 783-381. 
Leydesdorff, L., Etzkowitz, H., (1996). Emergence of a Triple Helix of university—industry—
government relations. Science and Public Policy 23, 279–286.  
Lissoni, F., Llerena, P., McKelvey, M., Sanditov, B., (2008). Academic patenting in Europe: 
new evidence from the KEINS database. Research Evaluation 17, 87–102. 
Mazzucato, M., (2013). The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths. 
Anthem Press, London. 
Megginson, W.I., Netter, J. M., (2001). From state to market: A survey of empirical studies on 
privatization. Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2), 321-389 
 29	  
M.I.T., (2015). The Future Postponed. Why Declining Investment in Basic Research Threatens 
a U.S. Innovation Deficit. M.I.T. Washington Office, Washington D.C. 
Narula, R., Martinez-Noya, A. (2015). International R&D Alliances by Firms: Origins and 
Development. Pp., 144-170 in D. Archibugi, D., Filippetti, A. (eds.), The Handbook of Global 
Science, Technology and Innovation. Wiley, Oxford. 
Nelson, R.R., (1989). What is private and what is public about technology? Science Technology 
Human Values 14, 229–241. 
Nielsen, M., (2012). Reinventing discovery: the new era of networked science. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton. 
OECD. (2015). Guidelines for Collecting and Reporting Data on Research and Experimental 
Development. Frascati Manual. OECD, Paris. 
Orac, (2015). The “myth” of basic science? at Scienceblog at 
http://scienceblogs.com/insolence/2015/10/27/the-myth-of-basic-science/, 27 October. 
Ostrom, V., Ostrom, E., (1999). Public goods and public choices. Pp. 75–105 in Ed. McGinnis, 
M. (ed.), Polycentricity and Local Public Economies. Readings from the Workshop in Political 
Theory and Policy Analysis. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. 
Pavitt, K., (1993). What do firms learn from basic research. Pp. 29–40 in Foray, D. and 
Freeman, C. (eds.), Technology and the Wealth of Nations. Pinter Publishers, London. 
Pavitt, K., (1987). The Objectives of Technology Policy. Science and Public Policy 14, 182–
188. 
Perkmann, M., Tartari, V., McKelvey, M., Autio, E., Broström, A., D’Este, P., Fini, R., Geuna, 
A., Grimaldi, R., Hughes, A., (2013. Academic engagement and commercialisation: A review of 
the literature on university–industry relations. Research Policy 42, 423–442. 
Polanyi, M., (1966). The Tacit Dimension. Doubleday, New York. 
Ridley, M., (2015). The Myth of Basic Science. Wall Street Journal, 23 October. 
Rosenberg, N. (1990). Why do firms do basic research (with their own money)? Research 
Policy 19(2), 165-174 
Rosenberg, N., (1991). Critical issues in science policy research. Science and Public Policy 18, 
335–346.  
Rosenberg, N., Nelson, R.R., (1994). American universities and technical advance in industry. 
Research policy 23, 323–348. 
Rossi, F., Rosli, A., (2015). Indicators of university–industry knowledge transfer performance 
and their implications for universities: evidence from the United Kingdom. Studies in Higher 
Education, 40(10), 1970-1991.  
Salter, A.J., Martin, B.R., (2001). The economic benefits of publicly funded basic research: a 
critical review. Research Policy 30, 509–532. 
Sarpong, D., AbdRazak, A., Alexander, E., Meissner, D., (2015). Organizing practices of 
university, industry and government that facilitate (or impede) the transition to a hybrid triple 
 30	  
helix model of innovation. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, forthcoming, 
doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2015.11.032 
Slaughter, S., Leslie, L.L., (1997). Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the 
Entrepreneurial University. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
Stiglitz, J., (1999). Knowledge as a public good. Pp. 308–325 in: Stern, M., I. Kaul, Grunberg, I. 
(eds.), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century. Oxford University 
Press, New York. 
Van Pottelsberghe De La Potterie, B., (2008). Europe’s R&D: missing the wrong targets? 
Intereconomics 43, 220–225. 
Von Hippel, E., (1987). Cooperation between rivals: Informal know-how trading. Research 
Policy 16, 291–302. 
